

Green and Modern Political Philosophy

SCHEDULE

LECTURE 1

23 April 2003 (1345-1530):

(1) Introduction to contemporary political theory, to environmental philosophy, to 'green political theory' and to the course itself

(2) Introduction to utilitarianism

Required reading: Kymlicka, chapter on utilitarianism (recommended)

LECTURE 2

7 May:

(1) Utilitarianism

(2) Social liberalism (liberal equality)

Required reading: Kymlicka, chapters on utilitarianism, liberal equality

LECTURE 3

14 May:

(1) Libertarianism (classical liberalism)

(2) **Environmental aspects of mainstream political thought:** animal liberation, the place of future generations, property rights and free market environmentalism.

Required reading: Kymlicka, chapters on (utilitarianism, liberal equality), libertarianism

LECTURE 4

21 May:

(1) Feminism, Communitarianism and analytical Marxism;

(2) Environmental aspects of critical political theories

Required reading: Kymlicka on communitarianism, analytical Marxism, feminism.

LECTURE 5

28 May:

(1) Civic republicanism and multiculturalism; The politics and ethics of (environmental) inclusion

(2) **Environment versus ecology:** why care?; intrinsic value; critique of Enlightenment and other alleged foes of nature; ways out: state versus society, consumer versus producer.

Required reading: Kymlicka on civic republicanism and multiculturalism, Dobson 1.

LECTURE 6

4 June:

(1) **Dobson's Green Political Thought:** an introduction to green ideology or ideologies?

(2) **Sustainability, sustainable development: what is it good for?**

Required reading: Dobson chapters 1-4 (5)

LECTURE 7

18 June:

(1) Brief discussion of ideas for and progress on papers

(2) **Conclusions: no time to waste?**

Required reading: Dobson chapter 5

NOTE

The 18 June lecture *may* be cancelled; its topics will then be discussed on June 4 (Lecture 6).

THE COURSE

Literature

Kymlicka, W. Contemporary Political Philosophy, Second Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Dobson, A, Green Political Thought. Third Edition, London: Routledge, 2000.

(Recommended:) Course notes, available at www.wissenburg.com

Exam

Individual paper, 10-15 pp. Deadline: Friday, 4 July 2003. (I would however *prefer* to receive your paper much, much sooner.)

You should in any case (1) use the literature prescribed for this course, and in so doing (2) convince me that it is likely that you read and understood it all. Apart from this, you are free to choose any topic you like, as long as it has to do with contemporary political philosophy and/or 'green' political theory. When in doubt, ask me.

Apart from being intelligible to an academically schooled outsider, criteria for a good paper include: correct English (!), proper layout, academic style (correct use of sources, no empty rhetoric, sound logical and critical thinking), correct and exact use of facts, terminology and theories, and (as compared to the prescribed literature and the lectures) originality. Plagiarizing other people's texts is intellectual theft and will be punished in accordance with Islamic rules for theft. A from a literary point of view fluently written text will count as an extra indication of quality. Finally, a *conditio sine qua non* for getting any marks is that you somehow prove that you have read and understood all the literature prescribed for this course - *without* (see above) needless summarizing.

Role of the lectures

The lectures serve multiple purposes, yet not all possible purposes. (1) they give *brief* introductions to the literature - *not* summaries; (2) they discuss things that are *not* in the books, e.g. the environmental implications of theories discussed in Kymlicka; (3) they give you an opportunity to pose questions & get clarification where the text is unclear; (4) they offer an opportunity to discuss and test your own ideas (take/grab that opportunity if I talk too much).

LECTURE 1

23 April 2003 (1345-1530):

- (1) Introduction to contemporary political theory, to environmental philosophy, to 'green political theory' and to the course itself
- (2) Introduction to utilitarianism

Literature: Kymlicka, chapter on utilitarianism (recommended)

Subject of the course (rough sketch - not all of this has actually been *said* during the lecture)

"Apart from raising awareness to the weak and strong sides of modern and green political thought, the aim of this course is also to familiarise students with instruments that will enable them to tackle political and policy questions of an environmental and philosophical nature. In this way students learn to analyse and to assess critically (the use of) complex philosophical concepts such as liberty, equality and justice or nature, sustainability and value."

In other words: (1) the basics of 'mainstream' modern political philosophy, Anglo-Saxon style (!); (2) the basics of green political theory; (3) the green potential of mainstream modern political philosophy. The three are mixed so you won't lose attention.

At the end (not beginning/halfway) of the course, you will *ideally* be able to *seriously* discuss the philosophical aspects of a question like the following: 'can we live in a Global Manhattan?' or 'should the swamp monkey be saved?' (Global Manhattan, swamp monkey - will be explained in due course.)

What does that mean? You'll be able to (1) *see* most or all of the ethical and epistemological questions that need to be answered before you can give a sensible (not rhetorical, non-reflexive) answer to the question of the swamp monkey's survival, and (2) then and only then *formulate* your own position.

A few examples of loopholes involved: (1) why should we care about the swamp monkey? (1a) do we value it intrinsically, and if so, what does that mean, or (1b) do we value it for a purpose/ instrumentally, etc.? (1c) do we value it as an object or as a subject? (2) does it make a difference how the animal got threatened? (3) to what kind of sustainability will saving the swamp monkey contribute - is that goal worth pursuing? (4) are the means by which we hope to save the monkey morally legitimate and are they consistent with our overall philosophy (e.g.: privatising and libertarianism, nature reserve and liberalism; special treatment and multiculturalism, etc)

As said before, at the end of the course, you will *ideally* be able to *seriously* discuss the philosophical aspects of a question like: 'should the swamp monkey be saved?' In reality it will, of course, take you a while to let it all sink in. Somewhere in the course of that process you'll write your paper. Note that the questions I just posed can be interesting material for your paper - but others are OK as well: should medicinal plants and/or knowledge of their use be seen as private property of e.g. first peoples? When can you legitimately eat a whale? Can vegetarianism be justified? Should public servants be examples of environment-friendly behaviour? Can the writing of my paper be considered good or bad from an environmentalist point of view? Can communitarians or multiculturalists defend citizenship rights for the great apes?

Literature, Exam, Role of the lectures, Schedule

See handout (= first two pages of this document)

Preparation: please read the chapters *in advance* - at least superficially prior to the lecture. Note that the deadline for the paper gives you time to catch up if you're behind. However - if you do not want to feel like a moron during the lectures, just read the required chapters *according to the schedule*.

Questions? email: M.Wissenburg@nsm.kun.nl

Introduction to modern political philosophy

(Briefly touched on during the lecture, but note the following:)

Kymlicka's thesis: recent political philosophy is about equality. My comment: there are alternatives for which one could just as easily argue: intuitionism, liberty, justice, impartiality, 'Archimedean point' theory (all will be explained in the course of this series of lectures).

The schools Kymlicka discusses:

Utilitarianism (to be introduced today and next week)

Liberal egalitarianism: Central role for John Rawls' versions of the Old and New Testament (*A Theory of Justice*, defending a liberal democratic welfare state (an anti-utilitarian, anti-intuitionist contract theory with special characteristics like the Original Position, reflexive equilibrium, and his famous Two Principles of Justice); respectively *Political Liberalism*.)

Libertarianism, in contrast to liberalism; Nozick

Other critiques of (mostly) Rawls: communitarianism, multiculturalism, civic republicanism, Marxism (Oxford version) and feminism (Ethics of Care).

Introduction green political theory

(Briefly touched on during the lecture, but note the following:)

At first sight: 'nature' is not a political issue at all. Nothing relating to the organisation of society. Environmental problems are technical, natural science and biology stuff. Nature is resources, resources are scarce even when renewable, hence the question seems to be: how to create a 'sustainable' mode of exploitation of nature?

First looks are deceptive, though.

There is the argument that environmental problems are radically more dangerous; hence call for research into causes, not effects/solutions; hence for a critique of modern culture, philosophy, religion - and political institutions. The political part soon developed into a critique of all existing political theories, even feminism.

Link to 'new social movements' of the 1960s. (Third world, nuclear energy, pesticides, health, nature, arms, feminism.) Link also to 'postmaterialism' but beware: Inglehart has less to say on this than is generally assumed.

Critique of this sort was soon combined with 'older' movements, nature conservation (esthetics) and animal protection (ethics).

The result: the creation of 'green political theory' as a discipline around 1990. Topics and schools (all to be discussed in this course):

- deep and shallow environmentalism: modes of behaviour
- deep/shallow green, hence ecocentrism/anthropocentrism; ethics
- critique of the Enlightenment, capitalism, industrialism: politics
- combined: new ideas (ecotopia) for society
- practical compromises: sustainability;
- win-win or lose? The three Ps of sustainable development
- etc.

Main distinctions: ecologism versus environmentalism, and ecology versus environment.

Introduction to utilitarianism

Most of this will be repeated in the next lecture; now only a rough outline.

Utility is the sum of pleasure and pain

Based on preferences

Background: assumed autonomy of individual in preferences; neutrality with regard to his/her theory of the good life; equality since all count equally. End of metaphysics, superstition & 'common good' ideas.

A few problems and distinctions within utilitarianism:

Average and total utility: difference lies in 'making happy people' and 'making people happy'

Act and rule utilitarianism (1st in Kymlicka's terms: U-agent); act-utilitarianism is self-defeating, too much information needed.

LECTURE 2

7 May:

- (1) Utilitarianism
- (2) Social liberalism (liberal equality)

Literature: Kymlicka, chapters on utilitarianism, liberal equality

Today's programme:

- (0) Schedule
- (1) Utilitarianism (revisited)
- (2) Social liberalism (liberal equality)

(1) Utilitarianism

1.1 Background in ethics

Types of ethics: deontology v. consequentialism; teleology, virtue ethics; types of deontology (duty, right).

Utilitarianism is a kind of consequentialism, therefore excludes the rest ('in principle').

Structure of the theory: utility, pleasure and pain, calculus; preferences, information

Assumptions: autonomy of individual in formulating preferences; human as rational egoist (compatible with altruism); neutrality with regard to his/her theory of the good; equality since all count equally.

1.2 Troubles (leading to creation of 'schools' in utilitarianism and for some to its rejection):

(Note that a problem is never a final & definite objection; philosophers keep trying to defend 'implausible' ideas - sometimes with success, in other cases at least resulting in arguments that can (with some changes) be fruitfully used in defence of other, even non-utilitarian, theories).

(1) four types of utility' (see book):

- welfare hedonism: the experience of happiness; hedonism
- non-hedonistic mental-state: things may feel bad yet be valued as good;
- preference satisfaction. Real life is generally preferred to machine life, yet it may not always be 'good' for us (=make us happy): avoiding dentist, using heroine, etc. (Note: weak critique; circular)
- informed preferences: rational preferences - but what exactly is rational? How do we know that? And: it may demand a lack of information, e.g. in case of adultery.

(2) collective and individual utility. Only the first is of interest *here*.

(3) Average and total utility: 'making happy people' and 'people happy'. Example: population growth.

(3a) Subtle addition: utility over life or at a moment/time slice; temporal impartiality.

(4) Act and rule utilitarianism (U-agent versus rule-utilitarian); information problem versus self-defeating (self-extinguishing) character of the theory

(5) cardinal utility, ordinal utility: intra- and interpersonal comparisons. Example: range goods, range possible worlds. NB: importance for economics and arguments for (free) market! An argument like this is needed to prove that an economic system 'satisfies preferences'.

In sum: $4 \times 2 \times 2 \times (X3) \times 2 \times 2 = 192$ types of utilitarianism are possible, and that *only* on the basis of 5 (or 6) philosophical problems. This goes to show (a) how flexible and vital utilitarianism is and (b) how much it is maimed in an average political cost-benefit analysis.

1.3 Problems of a more serious nature

1 Impractical? See u-agent

2 Inter/intrapersonal comparisons? See cardinal utility

3 Lack of clarity about meaning of utility? See four meanings

4 Problem of utility monster

5 Problem of responsibility and risk

6 Sacredness of preferences versus real world where preferences develop and change.

7 Trade-offs: one person's misery for another's happiness. Russian example.

8 Pushpin is as good as poetry; J.S. Mill's observation that utilitarianism has a problem with guaranteeing 'valuable' or intrinsically important things.

9 Sen on intrinsic value: things utilitarianism cannot represent (liberty; example of two choices of government; liberal paradox)

10 Rawls: taking difference between people seriously (see Kymlicka)

11 Rawls: critique on principle behind utilitarianism: equality is sacrificed to happiness; humans become utility machines. (see Kymlicka)

12 Rawls: insensitivity to different distributions of utility (see Kymlicka)

And this brings us to:

2. Social liberalism (liberal equality)

2.1 Introduction: Rawls

Three types of problem with utilitarianism function as reasons for developing The Other View, i.e., "liberal equality" or "liberal egalitarianism":

- its not taking the difference between persons seriously,
- its inability to account for the distribution of goods over a society, and
- its inability to deal with values other than utility/happiness.

2.1.1 Not taking the difference between persons seriously

At first sight, only an adaptation/extension of utilitarianism is needed:

- technically: utilitarianism is distribution insensitive: one rich guy plus a million poor is as good as a million and one almost poor people.
- argument behind that: humans are seen as utility producers (with trade-offs allowed), no attention for their personal dreams, ambitions, plans etc. In utilitarian terms: no guarantee that the resulting distribution will warrant social co-operation or the production of a maximum amount of happiness. Therefore utilitarianism is or can be self-defeating. Or so Rawls argued.

What is needed then is a theory of social or distributive justice, to supplement or possibly replace utilitarianism. Rawls focuses on distributive justice, by the way; social justice is "justice in society" in all respects, not just distributive.

What is distributive justice? Aristotle's typology of justice: justice is about 'not too much nor too little'. (1) General versus (2) particular justice; (2a) distributive (top/bottom distribution of collective property) versus (2b) commutative ('in exchange'); (2b1) voluntary between equals: trade, fair price is 'harmony', both parties feel satisfied they got as much as they gave; versus (2b2) involuntary: rectification of unjust exchange (theft) - 'retributive justice'.

Role of (re)distributive justice in society: St Augustine on robbers. Brief definition: assignment of scarce collectively owned goods to individuals on the basis of a justified principle. Note a few important assumptions:

- principle presumes equality unless good reasons for deviation are present.
- deviations in general defined as desert-based or need-based. (Ex: honours, aid.)
- equality of what is to be defined: of individual utility, happiness, opportunities, freedoms, rights, goods, etc.
- there is or may be a sphere of interaction exempt from the principle of distributive justice (e.g. market)

2.1.2 Second objection to utilitarianism: unable to deal with values other than utility or happiness:

- unable to include some things in calculation, e.g. liberty (Sen's point)
- unable to guarantee intrinsically valuable things, e.g. non-slavery, life, democracy etc.: they can all be sacrificed if utility so demands, since pushpin is as good as poetry.

One could call this the Intuitionist objection, or the deontological objection (question of taste). It begs the question: why should some things be worth more than (or something other than) "utility"? Usual answer: intuition says so. But the question can be turned around as well: why should utility be so important? Do we actually care more about utility than about (say) freedom, and if so, why should we or shouldn't we? The objection to intuitionism, also made by Rawls, is that it has or gives no order in 'what is important', nor a real guarantee of the correctness of its list of ideals. Reply or solution: an impartial justification procedure. And this is where Rawls came in (1958: amending utilitarianism) and liberal egalitarianism began.

2.2 Impartiality

In addition to the two objections above, Rawls had

(1) A few basic suppositions, inherited from utilitarianism:

- there is no supreme theory of the good: liberal/practical plurality plus liberal/enlightenment belief in the worth of autonomy through self-development.

- no a priori reason to distinguish between, discriminate against, act in favour of, any one particular person (not: all theories of the good are equally good - just persons): element of equality.
- (2) Plus more general ideas (old in philosophy, not necessarily typically utilitarian):
- undeserved inequality is to be ignored or even countered/compensated for.
 - rejection of pure democracy. No serious philosopher truly 'believes' in democracy without reservations.

All this leads to the basic idea that political institutions like the state should be impartial, first and foremost, *in a particular way*: impartial with regard to people's plans of life. Alternatives could be: impartial with regard to people's individual preferences (cf. utilitarianism), with regard to people's deviant ideas on religious doctrine, etc.

It also leads to a problem. As a pluralist, you don't seem to have a standard, something to hold on to, a decision procedure to choose between all the possible worlds in the universe. Without any reason to prefer any theory of the good, any person, the existing distribution of goods and talents, and without a random decision rule (democracy) - how do you proceed?

Answer: the impartial justification procedure, one that does not just:

- *apply* rules impartially (e.g. 'all blondes are to be shot on sight' can be applied quite impartially), but also:
- makes rules under conditions that guarantee impartiality and
- makes impartial rules (i.e., rules that everyone should accept, given or despite moral plurality).

Looks like an impossible task but all it asks is a bit of creativity and in no time, you end up with dozens of Impartial Justification Procedures. One standard solution in 17th-18th century political philosophy was the contract: motivated by fear of lawlessness (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau), we all sit under a tree, and trade and negotiate with our 'natural' rights and goods, until we all agree. But philosophers wouldn't be philosophers if they didn't believe that this is only the representation of a purely logical argument. (Background idea: consent itself does not matter - what matters is that, if rational, everyone *should want* to agree.)

Rawls began with a contract theory but argued that we, as real humans, cannot be really impartial. We cannot forget who we are and will always argue for our own cause only. Therefore he introduced the veil of ignorance, which guarantees both personal impartiality and undivided attention for all theories of the good, all talents and handicaps, etc. Second adaptation: reflexive equilibrium, supposedly guarantees acceptance in the real world.

Third and following adaptations: 'conditions of justice and choice', formulated in reflexive equilibrium.

Examples: 'well-ordered society', relative scarcity, moral plurality, primary social goods, rational disinterest, Aristotelian principle, obligations to future generations, list of moral theories, etc.

One adaptation worth discussing in detail: maximin - choice of the best alternative in worst-case scenarios (risk avoidance).

And that, Rawls believes, will lead to the adoption of the famous Two Principles. Rawls' theory has had an overwhelming influence in philosophy, in welfare state politics, in international and environmental justice, etc. (Important to remember that Rawls has revised his theory (*Political Liberalism*) and expanded it to international justice (*Law of Peoples*)).

2.3 Alternatives within Liberal Egalitarianism

Each and every one of Rawls's decisions (positions) has raised critique, resulting in alternative theories of justice - sometimes they are mere amendments or expansions, sometimes completely new theories. A brief overview (just for the record):

- Ackerman: neutrality aboard a space ship. No memory loss required, just willingness to stick to conversational rules. Division of manna plus complications.
- Scanlon-Barry: no memory loss, no fiction; swap theories of the good, stand in all shoes, be 'reasonable' (argue only for what you can prove) etc.
- Dworkin: special attention to something Rawls forgot: primary social goods do not mean the same to us all (think of physical handicaps, utility monsters, etc.). Hence his idea of an island setting, auction with shells, swapping until 'envy test' satisfied. Following that: idea of deserved and undeserved (bad) luck: pooling of resources, insurance (cf. Welfare state).

LECTURE 3

14 May:

- (1) Libertarianism (classical liberalism)
- (2) **Environmental aspects of mainstream political thought:** animal liberation, the place of future generations, property rights and free market environmentalism.

Literature: Kymlicka, chapters on (utilitarianism, liberal equality), libertarianism

Programme:

- (0) Leftovers from last week: liberal egalitarianism
- (1) Libertarianism (classical liberalism)
- (2) **Environmental aspects of mainstream political thought:** animal liberation, the place of future generations, property rights and free market environmentalism.

3 Libertarianism (classical liberalism in a new disguise)

One of the most important critiques of liberal egalitarianism, in particular of Rawls, comes from the so-called libertarian side. Briefly, libertarians argue that liberal egalitarianism sacrifices liberty to equality - and in that sense does not take the difference between people seriously, does not take their ambitions and ideas seriously, does not take their autonomy seriously, does not take humans seriously in their difference from all of nature, i.e., in being capable to deliberate and choose.

I discuss only one libertarian critique here, that of the late great Robert Nozick. Background of his theory: Locke's contract theory, particularly the idea of self-ownership and its result: free-market capitalism.

3.1 Justification of the minimal state

Natural Rights: Opening of the book: 'people have rights' - meaning: natural or absolute rights (Nozick does not explain which exactly).

Natural rights are derived from our natural needs; we are equal in that respect, therefore have an equal 'right' to satisfy our needs - and it is simply 'rational' that we try to satisfy them (note that this is an inconclusive argument - yet unchallenged for 24 centuries). One can compare this (in its intention) with the idea of maximum liberty compatible with the same for others (Rawls)

In Locke's theory, the state is there to protect natural rights, not replace them.

Note a difference in their conception of the state of nature:

- Locke: precedes contract (in other words, we're not born with obligations - or so Nozick interprets it.)
- Nozick: no contract but 'invisible hand' to justify the existence of a state.

Nozick wants a Fair Comparison: a friendly state of nature (nothing like Hobbes's short, nasty and brutish life), in other words the best possible anarchy, versus a state with all its alleged advantages. The argument comes down to this: no matter how nice anarchy may be, the existence of a state is inevitable.

3.1.1 justice begins with self-defence: minimal state

Assume that there are 'things' we may not do to each other (unspecified). What follows from this? Argument for a minimal state.

- * Security; agency; dominant protective agency
- * No state: no monopoly on violence, non-members not protected
- * One step beyond: monopoly on violence, ultraminimal state
- * Last step: minimal state (night-watchman)

How to make these steps:

- (1) constraints versus goals/end-states: 'people as ends in themselves', therefore inviolable, therefore constraints imply that humans are not used as means. Bit on animals and plans of life (next hour), bit on the experience machine, bit on 'meaning of life' basis of constraints, admit is-ought gap and underdetermination.
- (2) risk: justifies constraining people.

Note: minimal state compensates non-paying members, it does not redistribute anything. In short: justice in Nozick is retributive not distributive or redistributive.

3.1.2 justice is in entitlements: property

What are the things we may not do to each other? At least one of them is: stealing property.

Locke's conditions for legitimacy of property; Locke's proviso; Nozick's compensation amendment.

Basis of entitlements: honest work. Three principles for justice in entitlements. In other words, what we need is an historical principle of justice, taking account of what we have done to deserve our holdings.

(Alternative argument: Marxist basis - all rights are meaningless without right to property.)

3.1.3 Beyond the minimal state?

Can we get beyond the minimal state? No we can't. First of all, it would violate the voluntary nature of the minimal state created so far. Apart from that, two more general reasons, negative and positive:

1. Redistribution is nonsense

Chamberlain; the rejection of redistribution: requires end-result principles, neglects the history of existing distributions. Requires patterning and liberty upsets that. Cf Sens liberal paradox.

2. Justice is in entitlements - take them seriously or leave them.

Note two strong features of Nozick's theory:

1. ambition-sensitivity, not; endowment-insensitivity. Role of caritas. Note: liberal egalitarian problem with tax evasion/paying etc is in theory just as difficult and necessary as caritas in libertarianism. Note also: where's true solidarity and the appeal to humanitarianism - in anonymous agencies or in taking personal responsibility for the poor and wretched?
2. Strong argument against 'pure' equality and for the priority of liberty: it's what makes us humans special.

4. Environmental aspects of mainstream political thought

You now have some idea of the three most important 'normal' modern political philosophies. All others (in so far as discussed in this course) are 'counter-theories'. Theories opposed to ruling ideas and the powers that be are always very popular among students, and among everyone who's in any way dissatisfied with the way things are. Let's not discuss the causes for this interesting phenomenon (at least not here & now) - let's just establish that it exists. And let's remember that this knee-jerk reaction is logically unjustified: that political practice does not conform to theory (or to new aspirations) does not mean that the original theory is wrong. There are zillions of other possible causes. And let us also remember that the three 'normal' theories discussed here today were once counter-theories themselves: opposed to superstition and prejudice, opposed to exploitation of free and independent working people by lazy feudal lords, opposed to unrestrained capitalism. They deserve a bit of credit, perhaps.

The first question we need to ask - assuming we are dissatisfied with things as they are - is *whether* the theories we discussed cannot cope with our reasons for dissatisfaction. As a Dutch proverb says, never throw away your old shoes before you've got new ones. One of the major sources of dissatisfaction these days is the environment. In this final hour I want to discuss a few ways in which 'normal' theories actually *can* cope with this new problem - and note that it really is new in many senses: most of the environmental problems we face today did not exist or were not or hardly perceived in the days of Locke and Smith, Bentham and Mill, even those of Rawls and Nozick.

1. Utilitarianism

Let's start with utilitarianism. What can it do for the environment? Or actually - what has it done, because much of what it can do has already been done over the past twenty or so years.

Two examples:

- (1) animal liberation;
- (2) future generations

As for animal liberation: what matters for utilitarians is the capacity to suffer and enjoy. If you find that capacity elsewhere in nature, then the interests of the suffering or enjoying subject matter as much as those of humans. It follows that (some) animals count, morally. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*: calculus, plus interests in our handling of nature on behalf of other sentient beings.

A few things to note in this context:

- the status of animals is contingent upon empirical proof of their sentience;

- animals (like humans) do not have 'rights' - avoid the expression 'animal rights!' (The press usually doesn't)
- discussion on protecting individual animals versus species gets interesting impetus from utilitarianism
- sentientism (zoocentrism) precedes the present anthropocentrism/ecocentrism divide and disrupts it. Bewary of the dichotomy (as in Dobson, who's quite careful in this respect, but only if you the reader pay attention). And be aware that there are potential and often real conflicts of interests between 'environmentalists'/ecologists' and animal liberators.
- utilitarianism is part of the theoretical basis of RSPCA etc, and of many arguments for vegetarianism.

As for future generations: our responsibilities depend on how much we (including animals) care about our descendants (including animals). As a would-be mathematical theory, utilitarianism soon discovered that temporal impartiality is impossible (Beckerman argument infinite number of generations divide finite resources, leaving zilch per generation). Hence a discount rate is needed, destruction and deterioration allowed (think of forests respectively nuclear waste) and may be rational. One of the interesting questions that then pops up is the substitutability question (plastic trees - or 'new nature'), a discussion on which utilitarianism has had a deep influence (e.g. in favour of 'recreating' nature: if it feels as good as the real thing, it is as good.)

Important problem with utilitarianism is and remains (apart from 'classics' like intersubjectivity & sacrificing one subject's happiness to that of others): intrinsic or independent value. The only thing that is 'intrinsically' wrong for utilitarians is pain, the only 'intrinsically' good thing pleasure. Hence: no basis to defend nature if no one is harmed. Note that this is a *serious* philosophical problem - in other areas of life we often reject the idea of victimless crimes. (NB: I have more to say on and against 'intrinsic value' later in this course.)

2. Liberal egalitarianism

Rawls and his fellows can, and sometimes do, answer some of these objections. For example intrinsic value - Rawls' theory is designed to warrant just that, i.e., that there are things so important (like liberty) that they cannot be sacrificed to increase pleasure (welfare). For Rawls himself, though, nature has only instrumental value and thus remains a resource (but broadly defined: esthetics do count, for instance).

Rawls solves one nasty utilitarian problem (do we sacrifice 5 billion humans for the wellbeing of 5 trillion sentient animals?) by saying that animals cannot be part of a theory of justice - though we do owe them good treatment on other ethical grounds. Cheap solution, but it leaves the door open to other ideas. There is, for instance, the argument that we still *owe* justice to animals even though they can't *give* it: we share too many traits that make us humans (and therefore them animals) morally relevant - and we don't exclude handicapped or sick humans from justice even though they sometimes qualify *less*.

And Rawls has a solution for our obligations to future generations: the savings principle - not a fixed amount but an asset for next generations the size of which depends on what we can spare. Some have taken this to put limits to growth: we can't do just everything to nature. For some, even, the savings principle must be interpreted as prior to all other considerations of justice, all other principles, in fact making sustainability or sustainable development or nature protection priority number one for all liberals. There are lots of problems with Rawls' solution, e.g. why should we care *at all* about future generations? (Discuss.) Point is - there is room for growth here, for new ideas that expand the horizon of our concern to include (more of) nature. As there is in the other two areas mentioned.

3. Libertarianism

Finally, consider Nozick and other libertarian philosophers.

Nozick was the first to ask why humans matter - pointing to 'plan of life', then to human properties that make a plan of life possible, then to the fact that the difference between humans and animals in this respect is gradual not radical. In this context: aliens and gods prove that there still is work to be done to 'complete' this line of argument.

In addition, Nozick makes it possible to argue for rights, unconditional rights, for animals (case: New Zealand and the great apes).

Nozick's reviving Locke has also revived discussion on the Lockean proviso: enough and as good. Nozick's amendment (substitution/compensation) is important both in practice (destruction often really *is* unavoidable so standards are needed) and for philosophy: a lot of sweat has been spent on formulating and testing alternatives.

Finally, Nozick and his fellow travellers inspired what we now know as free market environmentalism, a theory with two key features: (1) property owners know best and (2) government regulations are unnecessary, inefficient and often counterproductive forms of interference. (1) supports the idea that if I own a forest I'll take care of it so as to ensure its value whereas public ownership usually means less care is taken (problems: economic value, substitution/destruction) (advantages: see native peoples and their forests and herbal medicines, etc.). (2) is used to defend e.g. (trade in) emission licenses.

All in all then, apart from the intrinsic value question, 'normal' theories do seem to offer a lot of room for environmental concern. Questions for the future: do the counter-theories do as well, or better, or is a new theory (ecologism) needed?

LECTURE 4

21 May:

(1) Feminism, Communitarianism and analytical Marxism; Environmental aspects of critical political theories

Literature: Kymlicka on communitarianism, analytical Marxism, feminism.

1. Today's programme:

(0) Leftover from last week: Libertarianism and the environment

(1) Feminism, Communitarianism and analytical Marxism; Environmental aspects of critical political theories

2. Communitarianism, analytical Marxism and Feminism

AND: Environmental aspects of critical political theories

2.1 What is Communitarianism?

- part empirical critique, part normative critique, of mainstream liberalism (Rawls etc.)
- part attempt at developing alternative view. Turned out to be more successful in this respect than Kymlicka expected: it still exists...

2.2 What is it about, in general?

- an idealistic (vs materialistic) conception of Self and Culture, of the Self as product and (to a lesser degree) producer of Culture.
- Conservative: clearly full of romantic elements, return to a (non-existent) past of 'closed' communities.
- A-political: it has little to say about the exact shape of the Good society, or about distributive justice, or production; in this respect, links to postmodernism are obvious.

2.3 What is it about, in detail?

2.3.1 Critique of the self

- Roots in Romanticism, Rousseau, also (a bit) in Wittgenstein (language game theory); deeper roots in conservatism through the ages, e.g. Roman critique of extension of citizenship and 'deviation from the paths of the elders' (loss of rural basis of Roman aristocracy, decline of interest/importance of rural life etc; Cato).
- 'Official' start as a (mistaken?) critique of Rawls:
 - o Original position: abstract(ed) individuals, the 'self' defined as prior to (existing independent of) its ends. (so-called unencumbered self). Would be an impossible picture of the true self.
 - o According to Sandel, the truth is that the self is 'embedded': it is identical with, defined by, its ends; it is part of and product of a culture, particularly a culture's understanding of good and evil, right and wrong; it is necessarily defined by and defines itself through, that culture.
 - o Therefore: problem of justification: the methods of liberals (OP, contract etc.) are insufficient.
- Extensions of communitarian critique:
 - o Nozick and all mainstream political philosophy: idea of a plan of life becomes impossible, since there is no distinction between self and ends, no conscious planning, no role in plan of life for culture.
 - o Critique of rights: property rights as in Nozick, deontic rights overruling utilitarianism (e.g. Rawls' 2 principles; cf JS Mill). Fear of an 'anomic' society where rights are used as trumps by egoists to destroy the fabric of society by putting the individual above the Common Weal.
 - o Link here to Aristotle's view of the good society, and to Plato (Politeia, not Nomos)

2.3.2. Critique of self-determination

- Rawls: allows every theory of the good & lets individual decide on her own
- Communitarians:
 - o Ideas and values are shaped by environment; theory of the good is a product of that environment
 - o One's culture/commonwealth has (incorporates) its own theory of the good (compare e.g. Dutch, American, Moroccan, Iranian cultures)
 - o Culture's theory of the good has priority over individuals' deviations (question of survival of the fabric of society, the basis after all of individual existence)

- It defines the margins for individual theories of the good, for individuals' plans of life.
 - Therefore no threat of destruction of culture is to be tolerated;
 - No room for ideas like the pointlessness of being or 'license'.

And all this would be both empirically true and normatively undeniable.

Note: communitarianism can be defended in two ways:

- liberal: taking all theories of the good seriously, including that of the ruling culture; since latter is a precondition for existence of former, it would have priority; and
- 'there are no 'rights' other than what a society's language game allows you to understand'

2.3.3 Critique of the Good Society

- Rawls: protect and maximize individual liberty
- Communitarians: Protect existing culture above all else and maximize its potential.
 - Not because it is good
 - But because it is THE good, the ONLY good we, as members and products of a shared culture, (can) understand
 - Thus: because it is good for individuals, prevents anomy, alienation.
- Explicit aim of communitarians: to create harmony in perceptions of the Good as seen from point of view of (human) nature, culture, and individual.
- Explicitly not said but implied:
 - No critique between/across culture possible, no 'higher' point of view;
 - All minority cultures in a homogeneous society are dangerous
 - In a melting pot society (cf. Walzer), there are probably two 'levels of culture':
 - Nation-wide: separate but equal cultures (examples famous...)
 - Intra-group: relatively closed culture

2.4 What has happened to communitarianism?

Philosophically, it is dead.

- opted for return to never-neverland or to totalitarian society
- (at least) vague about plural(istic) societies, might result in Rawlsianism if it were more serious
- impossibility of moral and ethical reflection, thereby of criticising (e.g. genocide in) other societies
- suppression of conflict in and evolution of society.

Yet it lives on in four ways:

- In Republicanism, see next hour.
- In Kymlicka's work (and other sort-of-Rawlsian liberals): minority cultures in plural societies; next week.
- In real-life politics: particularly local parties, local activism (cf environmental justice movement in USA); in (focus on) anomy, insecurity in the street, in calling for 'closer community ties'.
- As a dilemma in mainstream political philosophy (cf. intersubjective measurement of utility): the intersubjective bases of moral truth, vs Wittgenstein's conception of language games.

2.5 Analytical Marxism

2.5.1 Relation to Marxism, neo-Marxism etc.

Analytical Marxism (A-M) is not about applying or re-interpreting Marx's historical determinism in or to modern world under modern conditions, nor about changing the world. What it takes from Marx is strategically chosen:

- private inspiration and/or agenda
- part of the vocabulary and
- a few key concepts: equality, exploitation, alienation.

What you'll miss is e.g. false consciousness and ideology; labour value theory and economic theory; subject/structure debate etc. What it takes over from the analytical school is far more important: intuition, the method, presumptions of both forms of liberalism (liberal egalitarianism and libertarianism), and moral pluralism.

2.5.2 The ethical issue in Marx: the problem.

Most fundamental question(s) for A-M: what is wrong with alienation, what with exploitation, why go for equality?

Problem with Marxism: moral determinism vs political involvement (read: history vs justice) - if the first is true then why bother with the second?

British intuition: we *do* have feelings of justice - even Marx seems to have had them. Therefore either our intuition is wrong, or Marx is, or both.

Consequently three schools developed:

(1) Fake A-Saxon Analytical Marxism

Self-interest as objective basis of moral convictions, e.g. theories of justice; No impartiality possible and if it were, it would not appeal to anyone's conscience: since you can't raise yourself above your class and complete society, and since objective conditions (economy) preclude compromise a.k.a. justice.

Moreover, justice as 'remedial virtue' is a plot - invented by the rich and powerful to prevent development of a society of plenty. Anything to do with scarcity is a plot - cf. ecologism.

Marginal school; dismisses justice talk as twaddle. Why fake? Because it rejects the basic thing in analytical philosophy: the intuition.

(2) Half-Fake Same

Admits most of the above but concludes that terms like alienation and exploitation are meant in an objective sense, not as moral categories. Meaning (e.g.) that you're being exploited if you could be better off in a society of socialist equality. Implication can be (Kymlicka) that you end up with Rawls's difference principle. In the end even with his complete two principles.

Equality, Alienation, Exploitation etc. are (for this school) purely empirical criteria for social stability.

Cf Cohen on Rawls' Difference Principle: 'exploitation' by the doctor.

Note that Half-fakes still "demand" an end to scarcity, which may not be really realistic.

(3) The Real Thing

Assumes that intuition of injustice is real, genuine and sincere - and moral. Therefore it can be applied to distributive questions under conditions of scarcity like in Rawls's theory, and unlike one would expect of Marxists, as well as to matters of production (unlike Rawls but like Nozick). Doing so involves the old foursome: equality, alienation, exploitation and need. Led to distinctions between e.g. relevant and irrelevant inequality/exploitation; one can think of this like a reflective equilibrium between old Marx and new world. Example: exploitation in Marx is any advantage, in Real Thing and intuition any unfair advantage.

Where's the difference?

- force or duress involved? Could be for investments or greater good (taxes). Reject
- property to be earned not stolen? If that were true you'd need a libertarian theory of (self-)ownership and end up like one. Would also need a better distinction between consumer and production goods, or a complete rejection of private property.
- unfair starting positions: capital v labour. Seems OK solution, seems to fit Marx as well (calls for access to the means of production) but is just one step away from Rawls' access to primary social goods, and two steps from his 2P.

In sum:

Real Thing results in either liberal equality or libertarianism, meaning Marxism is internally contradictory. (And/or that Rawls is a pinko.) Some Marxists admit this, in a way: liberal theory is not (and is not as bad as) liberal practice - in other words, it is liberalism that is internally contradictory.

2.6 Feminism

What is feminism about, according to Kymlicka?

Another analytical school; partly critique of all preceding theories, partly theory in its own right (Ethics of Care, EoC). Kymlicka thus reduces Feminism to mainstream philosophy with the addition of Ethics of Care, the latter being a footnote to Rawls. His hidden agenda: it's all a misunderstanding. Example: Benhabib on (an unread) Rawls.

2.6.1 Feminism as Ethics of Care

Basic assumption in good old days of feminism: no relevant difference between men and women as such, therefore no grounds for discrimination. Two classic ways of doing justice to women ('remedial virtue'): formal equality (1900 - negative liberty) and structural equality (1960s - positive liberty; cf. 'fair equality of opportunity'). Neither really works (apparently). Three further strategies (my words, not K's): **Dominance approach; Difference approach; Ethics of Care**. All move focus from politics to cultural and educational changes.

Dominance approach is about identifying real structures of power e.g. in education, discourse, consciousness. From here to political correctness. In political theory: points to the distinction private/public (see Kymlicka: unclear) as source of continued inequality; argues for inclusion of private sphere in political debate.

Difference approach points to relevant differences between men and women; in character, biology, life etc. 'It's different for girls' in sex education, 'Why join the rat race, why aim to meet male standards?' in economics and politics. Hence, one could argue that women will never work as 'hard' as men and/or in the same jobs. Unpopular idea in some areas (smells of racism eg), but popular among eg ecofeminists. Danger of romanticising unliberating 'female life-styles'; cf. today's women's magazines. On the up side: 'change of culture' in e.g. parliaments (if successful).

Ethics of Care developed out of this: the different and intrinsically valuable way 'women' would think about ethical issues. (NB: 'feminine' not female.)

Three interpretations: capabilities, reasoning, concepts.

EoC as moral capabilities: affective vs rational - Gilligan. Kymlicka: rationality must be prior, needed to order affections.

EoC as moral reasoning: case-based, concrete vs principle-derivation thing. Example: child in pool. Kymlicka: gut feelings must be justified, principles thus needed, Sidgwick's test for intuitions needed; danger of reinforcing the oppressive side of EoC: appeal to 'care' creates slavery.

EoC as theory of new moral concepts: responsibility and relationships vs impersonal rights and cold 'fairness'. K: excludes people at a distance, could turn out oppressive; appears not to allow critique of the preferences that led X into a state where s/he needs to be taken care of (ambition sensitivity).

2.7 Summary of what went on before; environmental aspects of critical political theories

2.7.1 Marxism: in *this* form (analytical) rather unhelpful for the convinced activist. Unlike Continental versions of (neo-)Marxism, it allows no direct critique of capitalism, consumerism, productive relations, and all those classics. (Note that classic Marxism is absolutely anthropocentric!) But it does give an interesting perspective on (say) the 'exploitation' of nature: on the 'fake' school's interpretation, moral arguments and outrage are disallowed; on the half-fake's interpretation, analyses in terms of the system digging its own grave are possible - but again, moral reasoning is difficult. Only the Real Thing school allows moral arguments - but will ask not for action but reflection: to whom can the notion of exploitation be sensibly applied - do animals or plants have 'interests' that are harmed by our current modes of production? Separate question: is exploitation really bad? In other words, is every use made of nature immoral or are only some practices 'wrong'? In brief: analytical Marxism has quite severe standards for the validity of pro-environment arguments.

2.7.2 Communitarianism: a theory of inclusion and exclusion. Quite helpful in arguing that original cultures (old term, now politically incorrect: native cultures) with their 'deep' entrenchment in their environment etc etc deserve support - thereby also possibly quite unhelpful in arguing that the short, nasty, brutish life of original peoples may well be intrinsically bad... Quite helpful also in arguing for a more balanced, harmonious relation with nature in Western societies - but here we encounter two problems. For one: inclusion - nature (or parts thereof) can only be included in culture to a very limited degree (hence humans as guardians, masters - basically). For another: conservatism - if nature isn't part of our present culture, then what arguments do we have to actively include it?

2.7.3 Feminism: a comparison between exploitation of women & animals, or even nature, has been made by some ecofeminists but (severely) criticized by others as inappropriate, disrespectful, etc. Remember also the difference approach: 'female values' as being closer to nature - and the danger of reactionary interpretations of same. Problem of exclusion in EoC is even more relevant here than in human society itself. Yet some have tried to argue for a 'circle of concern' evolutionary theory of ethics (on positive/empirical not moral grounds), i.e. that our moral concern is growing 'outwards' through history, from family to tribe, nation, state, race, sex, humanity, towards nature.

Final conclusion:

All schools discussed so far (plus the two to come):

- treat Nature and resources as given
- accept 'scarcity' but only in Rawls' sense of the word: economic/psychological, not physical.
- offer at least some and sometimes much room for development in a more environmentally friendly direction (think of future generations, animals, protection against pollution, fair trade, etc.) BUT
- Until quite recently, 'environment' was not seen as a normative political problem (instead: technical and ethical - the latter almost exclusively for individuals not the polity); hence the radical potential of these theories has so far been (mostly) ignored.
- But to undo this, we first need a 'theory of politics and nature' (or environment or ecology): to bring order into this chaos of apparently unconnected ideas (scarcity, animal rights, intrinsic value, future generations, etc.) and to explain why these things would be of interest to *politics*.

LECTURE 5

28 May:

- (1) Civic republicanism and multiculturalism; The politics and ethics of (environmental) inclusion
- (2) **Environment versus ecology**: why care?; intrinsic value; critique of Enlightenment and other alleged foes of nature; ways out: state versus society, consumer versus producer.

Literature: Kymlicka on civic republicanism and multiculturalism, Dobson 1.

Today's programme:

- (0) Question time: anything pertaining to last week's literature/lecture and everything before that.
- (1) Civic republicanism and multiculturalism; The politics and ethics of (environmental) inclusion
- (2) Environment versus ecology: why care?; intrinsic value; critique of Enlightenment and other alleged foes of nature; ways out: state versus society, consumer versus producer.

1. Civic republicanism and multiculturalism

1.1 Citizenship theory means civic republicanism... It is an at first sight relatively ideology-free field of study in political philosophy (unlike libertarianism, social liberalism/social democracy, etc.). Looking closer, we see inspiration coming from three sources: the communitarian critique of liberalism, republicanism, socialism.

Communitarian critique: the self needs a culture, cannot exist without ideas of the good - even a liberal society has ideals of that kind. It therefore needs citizens that 'fit', therefore a more explicit theory of the good and a theory of virtue, citizen virtue, to accompany that overall social ideal.

Republicanism, dating back to Machiavelli's *Discorsi*, seems to offer the right approach: on the one hand civic pride, commitment to the cause of social co-operation (= the City, now the State), active involvement in politics - and on the other, no substantive elements other than this (= liberal enough...). Note that there are different traditions within republicanism. Kymlicka focuses on the now dominant mood, where the Aristotelian ideal of a flourishing human through political 'activity' rules high. There's also however the rather militant (militaristic) Machiavellian version that wants citizens to be ready, at any time and under any circumstance, to fight for their city ('my country, right or wrong'). And there's the stakeholder/shareholder version, limiting citizenship (rights, duties and virtues) to 'really' interested parties only (say, independent tax payers). But we'll leave those aside.

But then how to guarantee that citizens will take citizenship seriously (as compared to real world decline in political interest and participation)? How to protect liberal democracy against disinterest, devolution, etc.? Here's where the socialist inspiration comes in: a revival of belief in deliberative and/or participatory democracy. Note: deliberation concerns the quality of decision-making, participation the depth (pre- and post-decisional, etc.). Most authors focus on deliberation (talk-centric not vote-centric...). Basic idea is that information is freedom: it gets you into contact with different ideas, forces you to understand them, forces you to reassess and defend your own ideas, etc. - in other words, it forces you to rise above instinct and become an autonomous human being. And, incidentally, it also forces governments (etc.) to be open and responsible - a not too uninteresting side-effect.

Famous example: James Fishkin's experiments - locking ordinary citizens up for a week or so with local politicians, allow the former to interrogate the latter on a hot local topic, allow debate, and then compare (a) the citizens' preferences before and after, (b) the quality of the arguments they use to defend their preferences, and (c) their perception of the legitimacy of the final decision. The results are not too good - there's good decision-making but are there also good decisions?

Kymlicka briefly touches on one and ignores a second problem with civic republicanism. He touches on this issue of the quality of decision-making. Green theorists have done more here. In early (but post-authoritarian) ecogism, the ideal green society mimicked nature (a certain view of nature!) in that it stressed interdependence and solidarity, thereby requiring equal access to and influence on decision-making, etc etc, finally resulting in radical deliberative democracy. 'Oddly' enough it turns out that deliberation is linked to NIMBY-behaviour, and

nimbyism to shifting environmental burdens on neighbours. (And that's just one example). There is, greens theorists have found, at the very least no logically necessary relation between deliberative democracy and green results - and some suspect that the relation might turn out to be inverse after all. The consensus at the moment seems to be that green deliberative democracy requires green-minded citizens as *input* to work, and without that input they cannot be the output - but if they are to be the output, the result of deliberation, if deliberation is to 'help' the green cause, then the green insistence on deliberative democracy is perhaps logically contradictory.

What's ignored is: how do you get real people out of bed and away from TV, 'back' (as if they've ever been there before) into political activism? Most of us are tired after a day's work - physically and mentally. And most of us have other hobbies and loves, other than politics, that is - arts, sports, science, the garden, friends, all valuable activities (and in line with Aristotle's ideal of flourishing). It's not enough to establish that certain institutions need to become more deliberative (and then move on to discussing various instruments) - it's not enough to offer opportunity and even incentives, or contingent reasons (e.g. threats like the environmental crisis). What still lacks is an *intrinsically* good and convincing reason for citizens to become politically active.

Underlying all this talk of citizenship is of course the assumption that citizens have different but not too diverging theories of the good. And since this is a questionable idea, this explains the rise of a second 'new' field of research in between mainstream liberal political theory and the critique of mainstream thought - to wit, multiculturalism.

1.2 Multiculturalism arose against a well-known real-world background: the reality of exclusion. Exclusion of: coloured people, original people(s), minority religions, minority tastes, minority preferences, minority sexual inclinations, and so on. As Kymlicka argues, two considerations are crucial here: first, the fact that people, rightly or wrongly, feel marginalised due to their 'difference' from the average, the 'normal' population, and secondly, the observation that there is no normal person. All identities in our times are of would be fragmented: you can be and gay, and black, and single, and a Muslim, all at the same time. A political system designed to represent the 'average' citizen thus seems to lack legitimacy. And that is exactly how our systems are designed: based on (to use Hannah Pitkin's invaluable categories) representation as acting for not standing for. Liberal democracies are built on the assumption that even a set of 80-year old celibate men can represent everyone. In theory, that is correct (empathy) - in practice, it is questioned and questionable.

Now this is a (very rough) sociological analysis. For political philosophers, the problems lie in two (from their point of view 'deeper') sources of conflict. The first is a tension between liberalism and diversity. Liberalism is intended to offer a safe haven to all theories of the good, all cultures - but as on any free market, the stronger survive (notice the parallel with evolution). Hence there is fear for MacDomination by mainstream culture and the extinction of other, weaker cultures. And hence there are calls for minority rights, autonomy, et cetera.

Not all such calls may be justified - Kymlicka himself for instance is famous for distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary minorities: immigrants have chosen to join another culture, original peoples have not, hence claims to special treatment by the latter are and by the former are not justified. A very rough distinction, quite questionable, but theories have to begin somewhere. The point is that not every claim to special treatment is *a priori* justified.

Some however may well be justified. But the protection of threatened cultures is still at odds with liberalism, particularly when it involves inequality of rights - discrimination is discrimination, whether positive or negative; discrimination remains unjust. It may be the lesser evil but it is still evil. Hence theorists also discuss ways to mitigate the injustice of cultural separatism. Again, Kymlicka himself introduced one of the main ideas for this debate: the idea that one should tolerate being raised in one particular culture (majority or minority) if and only if it also offers a 'context of choice' - basically, access to impartial information on other cultures and ways to opt out of one's own cultural context. Note that this may well be the free market model all over again - if you as a Muslim (or Amish, or FC Manchester fan) marry a non-Muslim (non-Amish) and get kicked out of the family and the Muslim (Amish) community - then that culture is intolerant and deserves no protection against MacDonald's.

Liberalism is at odds then with diversity - that's the first headache for political philosophers dealing with multiculturalism. The second one is less widely discussed (that is, was less discussed until September 11th last year): diversity is also at odds with liberalism. What I mean by that is that no culture can defend its existence by claiming to be inferior to other cultures - that is simply illogical. Nor can a culture defend its existence by claiming to be just as good as any other - it is then also as bad as any other. It has no reasons not to exist nor reasons to exist - hence it has no reason to exist. Inherent then in any culture must be one of two ideas:

- (1) that your culture is morally superior to all others and should be shared by all others; or
- (2) that your culture is, for a chosen set of people, morally superior to all others and should be shared by those chosen few.

The second claim fits in beautifully with the Aristotelian view of diversity: cultures develop in dialogue with their natural surroundings - a barren landscape leads to an Apollonian egalitarian warrior culture, lush green valleys to a looser, friendlier but more unequal culture. (Again, that's putting it very roughly.) That is nice - but often insufficient to defend all aspects of a culture (e.g. the role of women), not to mention that most political philosophers have trouble accepting that Is statements can in any way imply Ought prescriptions...

The first claim, pure and undiluted superiority, is the real problem. There are age-old classical solutions: toleration of the intolerant to the point where they threaten tolerance. But these are and remain political solutions, that is, always temporary and always based on force, on weapons protecting peace. Philosophically, there is always the problem that it remains logically incoherent to on the one hand reject any culture's claim to superiority while on the other tolerating it.

Let me end by drawing your attention to a third philosophical problem that usually remains ignored in mainstream thought and in the critiques: the question of 'environmental inclusion' - in other words, in what sense is nature part of any specific culture, in how far should it be - and what parts of it? Can ritual sacrifice be tolerated? Or the scourged earth way of life of Central Asian nomad tribes? More in general: should the ecology remain (as it often is) a mere object for a culture - no matter how much it is revered, it remains external to the community - or should we defend a non-contingent respect for nature, against the norms of both minority and majority cultures?

2. Environment versus ecology

Overall conclusion must be that for 'mainstream' theories, critical or not, environment/nature is a given, and/or of secondary importance. Probably right, too: politics is about inter-human relations, everything else being of only remote interest - medicine, nuclear physics, astronomy, biology. That is - unless you can argue that there's a grave misconception at the basis of our understanding of politics (cf. the feminist critique of the public-private divide). And this is what ecologists (not the scientists but the political ideologues) have tried to argue over the past 30 or more years. A development (and ideology) reflected in Dobson's book.

I do not yet want to discuss Dobson's book itself here, yet, and would rather let it speak for itself - but I do wish to discuss a few 'fundamental' questions that he discusses only briefly, too briefly IMHO - questions that address the legitimacy of ecologism itself.

Background (see Dobson): the distinction between ecologism and environmentalism. Anyone can be an environmentalist, any ideology or political theory or philosophy can 'address' environmental issues (as we've seen) and even include them. But they're not the foundation stone of the theory, as they are in ecologism. Recently, the distinction has blurred a bit by attempts to argue that 'the ecology' can and should be the corner stone of e.g. liberalism, conservatism, even Christian or Muslim doctrine - but that's something for Dobson's Chapter 5. Here we'll focus on ecologism as it used to be.

The first thing to ask ourselves then is: why care at all?

Answers (traditionally) are anthropocentric and ecocentric reasons. But it's more complicated than that.

A distinction should be made between the source of value, the object, and the subject of value.

The valuing bit is always done by humans - 'antropogeneic' foundation of all eco-ethics thus unavoidable. We can do so on behalf of (=subject) ourselves or a more extended group. That gives us a range of options in between the extremes of anthropocentric and ecocentric: sentientism, zoocentrism, intellectualism, biocentrism, etc. - an often neglected issue. Even more complicated: the reasons - how do we qualify the object(s) of our concern?

This is where a classic divide between instrumental and intrinsic value pops up - which I would also like to question. In 'ordinary' human ethics, most value is instrumental (in a very broad sense): we value things as means to ends, and we value the ends again as means to further ends. It is only when we reach the ultimate end, the absolute end, that we begin to think in terms of 'good in itself', intrinsic value. A sandwich is not good in itself but a means to fill the stomach, which is again a mere means to survival; survival is (at least on some theories) not good in itself but only when it implies that a valuable life is sustained; and only that valuable life is

considered a good in itself. Sometimes. Overall, the term intrinsic value is used only in relation to our own existence – arguably because (in a non-religious ethic) we can find no further, deeper end yet cannot deny our own importance.

The implication of this view (usually but incorrectly associated with Enlightenment thought) is that nature and its constituent parts can only have instrumental value, i.e., serve as tools to human ends – and if they cannot serve as tools they would be worthless. The ecologists' gut feelings tell them this is unacceptable – and so they began to argue that nature has intrinsic value. Here's one of the main differences between ecologism and environmentalism then: the position on value. (Another: the centrality of nature in the design of the good society.)

There are two things to note here. One is that instrumental value isn't as bad as it is made out to be. The term instrumental is perhaps badly chosen – it may create the wrong impression, one of a self-serving bastard (the human) using everything and everyone around him for his own private pleasures. That does not need to be true – one could argue (for instance) that, given the antropogeneic nature of value, the only correct way to interpret the sacrifices of parents for their children is that they value the welfare of their children because of what the children mean to them, and what they mean to them is ultimately what the children mean to themselves – complicated but good enough to defend the idea that instrumentalism and altruism are compatible. As for nature – its 'instrumental' value can be extended endlessly as well: it need not be just an economic resource but could just as well be aesthetic, and not just a resource for us but also for others – animals, other peoples, future generations.

If instrumental value isn't so bad, the second thing to note is that intrinsic value may well be a bad alternative. The term has more meanings than you can imagine. I'll just discuss three. (1) Intrinsic value as value independent of a particular individual's opinions: all of humanity values X – which ultimately reduces it to instrumental value. (2) Intrinsic value as value independent of human opinions: X is 'objectively' good for humans. Same story. (3) The last person argument (explain) would show that we intuitively value nature intrinsically, that is, independent of the existence of any valuing subject. But the example is flawed since it asks for *our* intuition and we cannot really imagine a universe without us – not to mention that it makes intrinsic value a mere rest category, an 'as yet' unexplained feeling, which is no proof for its validity.

Is all this talk about value relevant? Definitely: without it, we have no reason to care about anything, nature or other. But is it useful? Try it for yourself:

- (1) the last swamp monkey – should we save it or should we only save species?
- (2) The last swamp monkeys: should we protect them always or only if their possible extinction is our work? In the former case, don't we risk a slippery slope argument (social security for worker ants, etc.) – and what is wrong with the slippery slope?
- (3) Vegetarianism: what is wrong with eating dead things? Is the problem in the responsibility for an animal's death (but it will die anyway)? Is it bad for an animal to die?

Finally, it is good to be aware of the problems involved in the intrinsic/instrumental discussion because positions here influence politics. Just one example: the definition of sustainable development as given by Brundtland. We'll discuss it in more detail later in this course. For now, all you need to know is that it sees nature purely as resources, purely for humans. It is at the very least questionable if it is compatible with any notion of nature as having intrinsic value, or even with the idea that animals should be treated humanely. After all, it allows for instance the replacement of one resource (say, trees) by another (plastic trees) if the latter is equivalent to the former. And if you try to amend Brundtland, you'll in fact contradict her: you'll exclude resources from use and thereby endanger the whole thing about maximally protecting the needs of present or future generations...

This has brought me back to the topic of politics. Politics may nowadays concern human-human relations, but we've just discussed a load of reasons for believing that may be wrong. Even if we can't choose the one and only holy and absolutely correct theory of value, we can say one thing: that there may be good reasons to value things other than humans, hence that we are responsible for those other things, hence that they are a valid subject of politics.

So how is it then that human civilizations (Western but quite a few others as well) came to think differently? Ecologists give roughly five reasons – and five solutions.

(1) Christianity is to blame. Or all Abrahamic faiths. To which green religious people have answered that ungreen versions of their beliefs are in fact perversions of the true faith, and that the problem lies elsewhere. To

which ecologists would answer that religions still put humans on top of the world... Solutions: no religion or a religion of nature (new age stuff).

(2) The Enlightenment is to blame – Descartes' subject/object divide, allowing us to distance ourselves from the world and see it all as means to ends, as elements of a machine that we can adapt, and so on. 'Demystification'. Solutions: pragmatism – we cannot think ourselves except because of, through and in relation to our surroundings; we constitute ourselves (i.e., do not 'exist' prior to constitution) by (deeply) experiencing our environment, including nature. Or 'post-enlightenment' theories: postmodernism, also holism (which, by the way, is at odds with all of the above).

(3) Capitalism is to blame – we shouldn't throw away the baby (rationality, Enlightenment) with the bathwater (unlimited free market economy). Capitalism rests on the growth dogma, sacrifices everything in its way, uses not only humans but also nature as mere capital. Solution: state interference, public ownership, socialism, communes, etc.

(4) Industrialism: since the environmental record of socialism was even worse than that of capitalism. Solutions: same, but add a change in lifestyle – the modest country life, William Morris-like ideas.

(5) An underdeveloped critique: 'human vice' is to blame – in the form of the producer (growth again, lack of incentive for steady state and/or avoiding supplying us with 'bad' goods) or the consumer (consumerism, same) in a free market, or (since free markets will always exist) the dynamics of the market itself. Solutions: game theoretical – (dis)incentives – plus ethical (preaching?)

In conclusion: all these solutions share one thing – they try to identify the causes not symptoms and cure them. But that does not define them as ecologist per se. The answers depend on the ethical positions taken – since (say) the extinction of a species or global warming is no problem unless we have reason to make it one. That is, unless we have specific reasons to 'value' nature or bits of it. Note that among all these possible *philosophical* constructions of 'the politics of the environmental crisis' only a subset is known, in *everyday politics*, as 'ecologism' – the rest is gray, environmentalism, animal liberation, et cetera. It is important to remember this because it implies that an ecologist arguing for the protection of the rain forest cannot easily do so with an appeal to the rain forest as a treasure trove of unknown medicines – that is an anthropocentric argument. And yet they do so all the time – to gain political support. And that again raises important questions: can an ecologist live with the idea of people doing the right thing for the wrong reasons (a change of behaviour not belief) – and does an ecologist lie when he appeals to anthropocentrism – and is lying necessary?

LECTURE 6

4 June:

- (1) **Dobson's Green Political Thought:** an introduction to green ideology or ideologies?
- (2) **Sustainability, sustainable development: what is it good for?**
- (3) **Conclusions: no time to waste?**

Literature: Dobson chapters 1-5

Today's programme:

- (1) **Dobson's Green Political Thought:** an introduction to green ideology or ideologies?
- (2) **Sustainability, sustainable development: what is it good for?**
- (3) **Conclusions: no time to waste?**

0. Miscellaneous business:

- (1) The deadline for papers: see course schedule
- (2) On 18 June there will be NO LECTURE but an 'open door day': from 11-12, 13-16 you can drop in at my office with any question you may have regarding the literature, your own paper, the weather and whatnot. (Room number: TvA 5.1_46).

1. Dobson's Green Political Thought: an introduction to green ideology or ideologies?

We are - already - nearing the end of this course. As announced in the beginning, these (my) lectures are (were) not intended to *recapitulate* the literature that you were supposed to read each week, but to *add* something to them. During the first few weeks I've nevertheless followed Kymlicka almost word for word, adding only a few comments on what 'mainstream' political theories might have to say or might contribute to political philosophical discussions of this relatively new and complicated thing called 'environment'. Or ecology, if you follow Dobson.

When we moved to Dobson I changed the tune, by not commenting directly on his book but instead by discussing topics he does not discuss or does not discuss in detail. We've got five such topics to discuss in this and the next (final) lecture. Let me give you the programme.

- (1) Continuing more or less where I left off last week, I'll discuss a recent debate in green political theory on whether it is possible or advisable to move beyond ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism (in ethical terms), or (in political terms) ecologism versus environmentalism. Let us call this the Practical Compromise Thesis.
- (2) Next, I (very briefly) discuss a concept often used to show that the Practical Compromise Thesis works: the concept of sustainability or sustainable development. I shall argue that it does not work. We should not see that as definite proof that the Practical Compromise Thesis is untrue, although I believe that it is. All that the rejection of sustainability as a basis for compromise shows is that we need to look elsewhere for shared conceptions.
- (3) If you've paid attention and if you are a bit creative, you will now see a parallel between on the one hand the objections of utilitarians against deontological political theories and deontologists against utilitarianism, and on the other the objections of 'mainstream' liberal political theory against green political theory, and vice versa. One party accused the other of wishing to impose non-neutral values on other people, and the other party accuses the first of not taking either humans or nature seriously. My final words today will deal with this dilemma - specifically, I shall ask if there's any hope left for ecologism.

Last week then, we discussed the question of intrinsic versus instrumental value. Although the distinction between these two is crude, as are the concepts themselves, I believe that two essential points have been made (and proved):

- (1) that there is no avoiding *anthropogenic* reasons to care for nature (or the environment, or the ecology, or whatever), in other words: that it is and must be humans who conceive and formulate the reasons to care for nature;
- (2) that an appeal to the *intrinsic value* of nature as one of these reasons to care, let alone as the main reason, is problematic. It seems that there is no positive proof for the 'existence' of intrinsic value - at best, the feeling that nature has intrinsic value represents the gut feelings that remain unexplained after we have analysed all our reasons to care, and reduced most to - in a very broad sense - instrumental value.

This brings me to a third essential point. It has been argued, not only by myself from a liberal perspective and by Andy Dobson (in other books) from a social democrat's perspective, but also by more or less non-political or straightforwardly 'deep Green' authors like Bryan Norton, Richard Daly and hosts of others, that the question of the existence of intrinsic value is a moot point. It would be *irrelevant* to the green cause (even self-defeating) and *redundant* in green political theory.

The irrelevancy, they (or we) say, would be obvious if we compare the results of a green politics based on intrinsic value to one based on an enlightened form of anthropocentrism. The results will be the same in all but two aspects - to which I'll turn in a moment. An enlightened anthropocentric still believes that only real-existing, living humans can be the *subject* of moral concern - but there are other categories that can be *objects* of concern, in other words, to which we have indirect yet strong moral obligations. Among these are our own future selves, our fellow humans, future generations, even animals. And when we take care of their interests as well as ours, we take as much *of* care of nature as any ecocentric, any believer in intrinsic value, would demand.

In addition, we will not only take as much *of* care nature - we will also take as much care of it. In other words: the circle of concern is (in practical terms) as broad as that of ecocentrism, and the *depth* of concern is the same.

The reason for this is that an enlightened anthropocentric takes a broad view of the (human) good life. It involves not mere access to resources (hence the assumption that resources can be swapped and traded - that trees can be replaced by paintings and oxygen producing machines). Instead it demands a *prima facie* right to access to *irreplaceable* resources as defined from any reasonable perspective. If experiencing, or even knowing of the existence of a particular bit of landscape, a bit of unspoiled wilderness, a weird species of fish 5 miles down in the sea - if any of that could reasonably add to the quality of anyone's life, then it's irreplaceable. And then it deserves protection, active support, in brief - everything a radical greenie, a pure ecocentric, could demand.

Like I said, there are two exceptions, two respects in which enlightened anthropocentrism does not have the same results as ecocentrism or belief in intrinsic value. One is that enlightened anthropocentrists demand *prima facie* right to access to irreplaceable resources - which means that it can be overruled by graver concerns, by more important rights, and which immediately raises the question what higher values there are than nature. This is something that might well be unacceptable for the deep green theorist, the ecocentric - if it were not for one little problem with ecocentrism: even ecocentrists have to sacrifice bits of nature sometimes. We all have to eat, after all. And walk, and breathe, and all that. So for the ecocentric the interests or rights of nature are also *prima facie*, and he or she also needs a principle to determine when those rights can be overruled. This, then, I would argue, is far less of an objection to enlightened anthropocentrism than it appeared to be.

The second difference between enlightened anthropocentrism and ecocentrism is less practical but perhaps more important. Enlightened anthropocentrism gives, from the ecocentric perspective, the wrong reasons for environmental actions. It accepts that people do green things (like recycling wastes) for self-centred reasons, even purely egoistic financial reasons. In other words, it says that it is good if people do the right thing for the wrong reasons. That's an ethical issue - I leave it up to you to take a position here. But I would argue that it's also a non-green issue, one that's not specifically relevant to or typical for ecological questions: it's a problem for *any* political theory.

For now, however, I want to draw a conclusion. Andy Dobson describes 'the' green ideology. He argues that there's only one truly green ideology, one characterised by ecocentrism and known under the name of ecologism. (Note that there are 'sub-ideologies': different opinions on the right form of *human* society.) All other ideologies may be 'greenable', may even actually have greened over the past ten, twenty years - but they remain mere environmentalist doctrines. I do not disagree with this as a characterisation of real-existing political parties and movements. I would however disagree if anyone drew from this the conclusion that political *theories* or *philosophies* cannot be as green as ecologism. (I'm not talking about ideologies of political parties here but about the qualitatively better founded sources of inspiration...) All it takes to be green (as a philosophy) is that you adopt an enlightened anthropocentric position - and take that seriously.

Now this much for theory. In the field of political theory, I and others (including Dobson, but elsewhere) would argue that the anthropocentrism/ecocentrism debate, the intrinsic/instrumental value distinction, and the ecologism/environmentalism dichotomy are immaterial. But does it work that way in practice? Let us look for a moment at the most famous attempt to 'pacify' the green movement: the introduction of the concept of sustainability.

3. Sustainability, sustainable development: what is it good for?

Over the past twenty years, environmental issues have - finally - been given room in politics and policy making. Environmental movements have, in other words, been quite successful in putting these issues on the political agenda. They've even begun to work closely together - more as a loyal opposition than as outright opponents - with governments, large corporations and organisations of smaller companies, on implementing environmental measures and policies. And in return, governments and corporations have, at least officially, adopted attention for the environment as a key objective. All this is done under the flag of sustainability or sustainable development - the latter usually defined in terms of the Brundlandt Report as taking care of the needs of present generations without compromising the capacity of future generations to take care of their own needs.

It sounds great - it sounds as if practical compromises are possible. They are, but there is a price to be paid. And to see that, you need political theory. You need to analyse the concept, discover its different interpretations, and assess who is benefited by which interpretation.

There is a huge amount of literature on this subject - I cannot even begin to discuss it in details. I'll just give you some of the conclusions.

First, we need to note that 'sustainability' itself means nothing more than perpetuating the existence of something for a given period of time. Hence, there are different conceptions of sustainability in terms of *time*: sustaining X for the next fifty years, for the next ten generations, forever? And forever is a very long time - dinosaurs lived for millions of years but not infinitely, so why should the whale?

Hence also there are different conceptions of sustainability in terms of the *object* that is sustained: one particular human society or culture, that society plus its natural environment, the whole of humanity, humanity plus animal life, living nature, specific biotopes or the ecological system as such. Note that the Brundlandt conception is definitely human-centred: it talks of present and future generations of humans only. Anyone arguing in favour of including animals not as livestock or of including nature as more than a mere recreational resource does not fit into the Brundlandt scheme.

One step further: even if we specify sustainability as sustainability of the ecological system including humans, it can still imply any number of things since sacrifices are inevitable. We cannot, as a rule, have unlimited population growth without using (and sacrificing) more of nature; and we cannot probably keep nature as it is without curbing population growth - and to do that effectively, probably intolerable suffering would have to be imposed on real-existing, living, breathing, dreaming human beings, women in particular. This, even a sustainable ecology can mean anything - from a call to return to nature, back to the lifestyle of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Noble Wild, to a global Manhattan where only humans and the algae on which we would live exist.

And finally: there's more that is important in politics than ecological sustainability. To guarantee that, we also need social sustainability - the continued existence of societies, which usually is taken to include the continuation of the economy, of a productive system, and of social co-operation, justice. But again, many roads are open here. The Brundlandt definition only takes one: it argues for 'sustainable development', that is, sustainability combined with growth, particularly economic growth, and combined with development, i.e., justice between the North and the South. It is easy to see that these three demands (nowadays often referred to as PPP, People, Profit, Planet) can bite each other - what is good for the South may not be good for the North or for nature, what is good for nature may not be good for North and South, and so on.

To conclude: sustainability is a deeply political concept, not just 'contested' but *politically* contested. Different interpretations lead to the exclusion or discouragement of some and the promotion of other interests. In practice, nowadays, in terms of the Brundlandt definition, it excludes animal liberation, it excludes any conception of the good life in which nature is more than mere resources for humans, and it excludes almost any conception of the good that rejects material growth as a desirable goal in life. It also puts limits to, and thereby discourages, the

preservation of nature - which is considered, at least in principle, something that can be sacrificed in the interest of growth, here or in the South.

If sustainability is to illustrate the Practical Compromise Thesis - it fails miserably.

3. Conclusions: no time to waste?

A few almost-final words to complete this course:

Ideally, you are now acquainted with the eight most important schools in modern political theory. When and in so far as I had time for it (I've learned from this course that I need to give this more time next year), I tried to illustrate how these 'mainstream' theories work out if applied to the still relatively new, and therefore non-mainstream, field of green or environmental political theory. You can find more on this topic in my course notes on the internet - since the course notes contain everything I *planned* to say.

We then turned to Dobson's book, a what you might call 'logical reconstruction' of the ideology behind green political parties and social movements. Last week, Jasper, in his presentation, made an important and very good point: Dobson has a thing for defining 'real' ecogism and dismissing everything else as shallow or inconsistent environmentalism. There seems to be a kind of circular reasoning behind this: the only way, after all, in which you can extract 'real' green thought from the ideas of existing movements, and distinguish real from shallow, is if you already have a pre-fixed idea of what 'real' green political thought is.

An alternative approach would be sociological: you'd then investigate the ideas of all green groups, the ideas behind all environmental and other policies, and the ideas of what you would intuitively call non-green groups - corporations and industry in particular. You would then let the data speak for themselves and get a more complete and impartial perspective on all green political thought, from radically deep green to very shallow.

If you want that kind of perspective, there is a good book available - Alan Carter's very recent *Introduction to Green Politics* (2002). Or for animal rights, Michael Tester's book (forgot the title, probably simply *Animal Rights* - roughly from 1994). But I must say one thing in defense of Dobson and his book. What you would miss in a sociological analysis and what you get in Dobson's book are two things:

- (1) the *reasons* and arguments for particular positions (whereas a sociology of environmentalism would be only descriptive), and
- (2) an analysis of why some positions are more coherent and - therefore - more distinctly green than others.

And it is these things in which a political theorist is interested: arguments, their validity, and their consistency when combined with each other. It is also something that should interest citizens: there is something appealing about knowing not just why we make the choices we make but also knowing why we are making the right choices - or the wrong ones.

And that brings me then almost to my conclusion. Political theory is (as far as I'm concerned) a field in which progress is seldom or never made. It is mostly just a repetition of age-old arguments and age-old problems, arguments and problems of an abstract and sometimes almost purely logical nature, in new, concrete, contexts. That applies to utilitarianism, the roots of which you can find in for instance classical hedonism, it applies to communitarianism, with its roots in Cato's critique of Rome, it applies to civic republicanism, with its similarity to Pericles - and it applies to green political thought. I'll give you one example, and hope you have been able or will be able to find others for yourself.

If you've paid attention and if you are a bit creative, you will now see a parallel between:

- on the one hand the objections of utilitarians against deontological political theories and
- deontologists against utilitarianism,
- and on the other the objections of 'mainstream' liberal political theory against green political theory, and
- vice versa.

One party accused the other of wishing to impose non-neutral values on other people, and the other party accuses the first of not taking either humans or nature seriously.

This is an important dilemma - a non-neutral theory is in important respects incompatible with our modern, pluralist society; on the other hand, a neutral and green political theory is, it seems, a contradiction in terms. So what to do? Can ecologism, or its message, be saved? If we feel there is something interesting about ecologism, regardless for what reason - political, private or purely intellectual - then we have to be realistic. In the words of Ché Guevara: let us be realistic, let us try the impossible. Let us try to see if a green political theory can really not be neutral. If we may believe Dobson, Chapter 5, efforts to do that have so far not been totally successful. But remember what happened to utilitarianism - it adapted to critique time and time again, and survived until this day. Green political theory too can perhaps evolve: adapt to a new environment, develop new traits, bring forth unsuccessful subspecies and perhaps a few successful ones.

Those then were my final words.